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ABSTRACT
The role of the l'hiJ:t ppine bases in augmenting the Maritime
Srrate EY of the Uni t ed Statf's Na vy 's r e gional mis sjoll of
deterrence and sea l ane protection is be i n g closely scrutinized
due to a leadership chan ge i n t he Phi l i ppi ne s and possible
military budget cuts at home. This s t udy eva Lua t e s the assets
of the Subic Bay Naval Station, Cubi Point Naval Air St a t i on ,
and Cl ark Air Force Base and the support provided hy these bases
to Southeast Asia , Northeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean/Persian
Gulf. In t.he event of a peace-time loss of the bases, option s
for relocation of forces a r e evalua t ed.
Historical development of the bases since 1947 is reviewed
with the specific intent of demons t r ating how the bas e agreement
has evolved from almost total U.S. control to the weak U. S.
posi t Ion which exists today. At the same time, the Soviet
threat has continued to spread into the region a s the developing
countries have expanded their economic and political influence.
The study concludes that the Philippine bases ~re currently an
irreplaceable component of the Navy's effort to maintain a
viable naval presence in the region.
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
For many yea r s , the United States en j oyed a very convenient
arrengemen t with former Philippine President Fer d i nand E. Marcos
which provided facilities for huge U.S. military base s in the
Philippines. However, this arrangement has not been without
conflict. Con~ress has played a vital role by keeping the issue
of the PhH ippines and the ?-farcos regime a highly visible
foreign policy matter over the years by forcing administrations
to constantly justify and re-examine policies towards Harcos,
the Philippines, and the U.S. military facilities located there.
Members of Congress in both parties have criticized Marcos at
least s Inc e 1972, "Then he imposed martial law. In 1979, Rep-
resentative Tony P. Hall, D-Ohio, made the first major effort to
block military a i d to the Philippines as a protest against
Harcos. The Carter administration defeated that attempt,
arguing that the aid was needed to carry out an agreement for
the U.S. basis in the Philippines.
The Reagan administration successfully used the seme
argument to thwart similar attacks on aid to the Philippines.
But, the 1983 Aquino assassination changed the mood in Congress
and made it impossible for the administration to quell anti-
Marcos sentiment. Consistent rumors of economic corruption and
human rights violations in the Philippines by the Marcos regime
added further irritation to Congress.
2I n 1984, ove r President Rea gan's objections, Repr e s entative
Stephen J. Solarz , D-New York, pushed throu01 a f ormula by vhich
c on gr ess r educed military aid, and increased economic aid, a s a
symbol of Congressional unhappines s wi t h Marcos. Congres s took
t he same s t e p i n 1985, threatening future aid r eductions unless
NH~'COS held f ree elections and made ot her reforms. In October
1985, r es ponding in part to Congressional pressures, Reagan sent
Senator Paul Laxalt, R-Nevada, to Hanila with warnings to Marcos
that t he United States was s erious abou t the need for reform.
Laxalt' s wa r n i ngs apparently helped convince Marcos to ca l l the
"snap" elections, as wel.L as ask for official U. S. observers.
Following the February 7, 1986 election, the observer
delega t i on produced evidence that documented the extent of fraud
on the part of the Marcos ruling party, convincing the Reagan
administration that Marcos had stolen the election. Immediately
after the election, the Senate pass ed a Resolution (S RES 345 )
denouncing fraud by Marcos' party and a House subcommittee
initiated legislation to suspend U.S. aid. The final, almos t
incredible , series of a c t i on s that led to Marcos' downfall began
on Fe br ua r y 22 , 1986 when Defense Minister Juan Enrile, a close
Marcos ass oc iat e , and LT. Gene ral Fidel Ramos, the armed forces
deputy chief of staff, abruptly resigned, demanded that Marcos
give up power, and took up positions in military installations
in Manila. With the increasing pressure of the U.S. Congress
and h is friends and associates fleeing his side, Marcos received
3guidance from Senator LaxaJ t to step down and left the
Philippines on Fe bruary 25.
This rapid serjes of events thrust Corazon Aquino, the U.S.
educ a t ed widow of asscssinated opposition leader Benigpo S.
Aquino, Jr., into the Philippine presidency and has created
serious conceU1S for the United States and the future potential
for maintaining our bases in the Philippines. Corazon Aquino
inherited a country with a depleted treasury, stagnant economy,
and communist supported guerrila war which is attempting to
destabilize the Aquino government.
To further complicate the matter , for the first time ever,
a president has come to power in the Philippines having made a
statement several years ago favoring the eventual removal of the
bases. In 1984 and 1985, Aquino also said she would not accept
any other foreign base on Philippine soil after the U.S. mHi-
tary leaves. Although Aquino's election and post-election
comments on the issue have narr oved somewhat, she has made no
guarantee regarding the future of U.S. military bases in the
Philippines. Most recently, President Aquino has indicated
(Clad, 1986) that the "options are open" after the current base
agreement expires in 1991.
With the recent events noted above, this paper will focus
on the role of the United States military bases in the
Philippines, their strategic importance, and options for alter-
native basing arrangements in the Southwest Pacific. The
4two specific hypotheses that are address ed through a review of
thl~ politics and geo graphy of the Philippines a r e :
The U.S. military bases in the Philippines are critical
to the promot i on of regional stability, and the ability of the
U. S. Navy to carry out i t s maritime strategy of forward deploy-
ment as deterrence.
and
The options for alternative basing arrangements are
unacceptable and inadequate if the U.S. is to maintain the.
current capabilities in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean/
Persian Gulf.
To test the above hypotheses, several considerations a r e
addr es s ed . The physical facilities and capabilities of the
current bases in the Philippines are described including a brief
history of the base agreements. The strategic importance of the
bases are reviewed as they apply to the Indian Ocean/Persian
Gulf Region, Northeast Asia, and Southeast Asia. In addition,
the application of the U.S. Navy's maritime ~trategy of obtain-
ing regional deterrence through the fOHrard deployment of assets
is evaluated in connection with the U.S. bases in the
Philippines. The influence of both Soviet naval activity and
the Association of Southeastern Asian Nations are reviewed in
relation to the Philippines. Finally, alternatives for relocat-
ing the assets and facilities are evaluated and include Japan,
Guam, Tinian, Saipan, Taiwan, Singapore, and Palau.
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THE PHILIPPINE BASES
A History of the Base Agreements
Historically, the Philippine bases have been under some
type of U.S. influence since 1898, when the Philippines and Guam
,~ere acquired from Spain as a result of the Spanish-American ~ar
and the Treaty of Paris. However, it was n ot until after World
War II th~t they developed the importance that they hold today.
Immediately followine the war, negotiations began for the use of
the bases with the initial agreement being signed in 1947.
Under the terms, the United States received unrestricted use of
23 bases throughout the country, rent free for 99 years.
Additionally, a joint military advisory group was established to
help train and rearm the Filipino military. Free access was
granted for U.S public vessels and aircraft, as well as full
authority for operational use and control.
In response to the Filipino fear of another U.S. abandon-
ment similar to the one in 1941, after the Japanese invasIon,
the MutuaJ. Defense Treaty was signed in 1952. Article IV
states:
Each party recognizes that an armed attack in the
Pacific area on either of the parties would be dangerous to its
own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the
common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes
(May 1985).
This article resulted ;in ambiguities concerning the rights of
the United States to unrestricted use of the bases in
non-Filipino matters and the U.S. obligation against domest i c
insurgencies.
In 1959, some of the doubt was removed when the American
Ambassador and Philippine Foreign Secretary established the
"prior consultation" clause in the Treaty. The United States
now had to consult with the Philippine government before
engaging in military operations not associated with the 1952
Mutual Security Treaty. This esseLtially gave Veto contrel over
U.S. operations originating from the bases to Philippine
leaders.
By 1966, the first major change to the original base
agreement occurred with the changing of the terms of the lease.
The original 99 years was changed to expire in 1991, at which
time the lease would become indefinite but subject to the
cancellation by either party after a one year notification.
The next major bos e agreement conference in 1979
incorporated several changeD that gave the Philippine government
much greater control over the bases. In particular) these were:
1) Recognition of Philippine sovereignty over the
bases.
2) Placement of the bases under Philippine command
while retaining U.S. control of the facilities
within the bases.
3) Turning peripheral security over to the Philippine
military, while retaining the right for the U.S.
Commander to participate in security activities
within the bases) but not outside the U.S.
facilities.
74) Mandating of a continous five yea r r ev iew of the
base agr eemen t s .
5) Agreements for a rent-type payment of $500 million
in grants ancI l oans over the next five ye ars eU.S.
Congres s 1984a).
By 1979, the number of active facilities maintained by the
U.S. Hili tary in the Philippines , '18S down from the origlnal 23
to the following six:
1) U.S. Naval Base, Subic Bay/Cubi Point;
2) Clark Air Force Base;
3) John Hay Air station, Baquio City;
4) The U.S. Naval Radio Station,Capas, Tarlac;
5) The U.S. Naval Communications Station, San Miguel;
and
6) Wallace Air Station.
The l~st base agreement review took place in 1984 with
President Marcos raising questions about the use of the bases
for Middle East operations. In 1982, while attending a m:d.te
House dinner, he warned his host that Philippine-based U.S.
forces do not have "carte blanche" to oper a t e in the Biddle Ea8t
but are restricted to hostilities necessarily relevant to the
safety and security of the Philippines and Southeast Asia.
Regardless, the conference ended in a new agreement with
President Reagan promising to push Congress to raise the $500
million grant and aid package to $900 million for FYs 85-89. In
reviewing the ne", agreement, Admiral Robert L. J. Long,
Commander of U.S. Forces in the Pacific in 1983 stated:
81 believe our obje~tives were met. TI1e principal
elements of the memor andum of agre ement are:
1) reaffi rmation of our continual unhampered use of
our military facilities;
2) e s t abl i shmen t of a joint committee to de al ..lith
issues which arise with the implementation of
the Hilitary Eases Agreement; CWe have similar
committees in Japan and Korea for the same
purpose);
3 ) reaffirmation of the U.S. commitment for
consultations prior to use of the U.S.
facilities in the Philippines for military
combat operations Cot her than those conducted in
accordance with the U. S . - Ph i l i ppi ne Mutual
Defense Treaty) prior to e s t ab l i shment of long
range missiles on the U.S. facilities;
4) formalization of procedures for a cc e s s by the
Philippine Base Commander and his designated
representative to the U.S. facilities faT the
submission of information regarding U.S. forces
permanently stat10ned in the Philippines and
their equipment and weapon systems; and
5) agreement to meet within six months to discuss
possible revisions to the base labor agreement
CU.S. Congress 1984a).
The next review in 1991 will be the first in which the base
agreement will be operating under the one year termination
clause. Additionally, it will be the first involving the new,
more liberal government of the Philippines. Preliminar y
discussions have been initiated; however, it is far too early t o
discern any indications for the future of the bases agreement.
The conce r n on the part of the United States is the stability of
the Aquino government. In the first f i f t een months of her term,
she has had to deal with rebellion within the miitary ranks,
political adversity from rivals, and the ever present communist
party (New Peoples Army).
9Of additional concern to the United States is the trend of
the ba s e agreements. It has evolved from once absolute U. S .
control, t o the present agreement in which indi~ect rent is paid
to the Philippine government and acknowledgement of sovereignty
of the land is recognized. Additionally, the trend of reduction
from the or i gi na l 23 facilities to the current s i x previously
noted is significant.
Capabilitjes and Facilities of the Bases
In view of the recent political events in the Philippines,
and the trend of the agreements fer the bases to recogni ze
Philippine s overeignty, it is appropriat e to evaluate the
physical facilities of the U.S. bases in the Philippines. As
noted previously, there remain only six operational U.S.
military i nstallations. Only two of these, the naval complex at
Subic Bay/Cubi Point and Clark Air Base, are considered to be of
primary importance. The rest, John Hay Air Station, U.S. Naval
Radio Station, U.S. Naval Communication Station, and Wallace Air
Station are considered to be extensions of either Subic Bay or
Clark.
Subic Bay Naval Base is the largest U.S. operated complex
outside the United States, covering over 36,000 acres including:
IO
Subi c Naval Station;
Na val Ship Repair Facility;
Naval Supply Depot;
Naval Hagazine;
Public Works Center;
Cubi Point Naval Air Station;
Naval Hospital; and
Naval Communications Station (San Miguel).
It is the traditional back bone of the Seventh Fleet's deployed
operations. Its 45-foot deep harbor is one of the few in the
Western Pacific with the capacity to take an aircraft carrier
pierside, and is large enough to accommodate several carrier
battle groups. Subic Bay's natural asset, a well-protected
harbor in a warm tropical climate, has been a prize of major
naval powers since Spain began constructing a naval facility
there in the late nineteenth century. The U.S. Navy currently
has one ship homeported in Subic, the USS Sterett (CG-31), a
guided missile cruiser.
Logistical and supply tasks are carried out at Subic Bay by
three major facilities: the Naval Hagazine, the Naval Supply
Depot, and the Naval Ship Repair Facility. The Naval Magazine
stores, services and distributes ammunition and explosives to
all units of the Seventh Fleet. Currently, it handles over $200
million worth of ammunition which is stored in approximately 200
permanent magazines and stands.
One of Subic Bay's primary tasks is the storage and
distribution of fuel and other consumable goods for the U.S.
Seventh Fleet, U.S. Medical Center, Clark Air Base, and John Hay
Air Station. This mission falls under the Naval Supply Depot.
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A 43 mile pipeline , owned and operated by t he U.S. Ai r Force,
has be en c.ons t r uc t ed f r om Sub :lc Bay to Clark Ai r Bas e f or t he
transport of fuel. A s i gnifi can t por t i on of the Seventh Fleet' s
prepositioned wartime oi l reserves are stored at Subic Bay , and
the Seventh Fleet and ot he r ve s s els are supplied by t he Pacific
Fleet Combat Logistic Force operating out of Subic. ~ith a
capaci t y for handling over one million barrels of fuel a month,
and an inventory of over 150,000 supply items, Subic Bay is the
largest and most comprehen s i ve support f a c i l i t y ava i l abl e to t he
U.S. Navy in the Indian Ocean/South Pacific Region.
Just a s i mportant as the deep harbor and supply facilitie s
is the Ship Repair FacHi ty (SRF ) whI ch performs about
two-thirds of all maintenanc e on ships of t he Seventh Fleet. It
overhauls about 250 ships annually, has three wharfs that can
dock an y ship in the fleet, and a dry dock large enough t o ho ld
any ship except an aircraft carrier or battleship.
Additionally, the SRF us es h i ghly skilled local labor with
relatively low pa y scales. According to Pentagon of f i c i a l s, the
labor on an overhaul at Subie co st s one-third as much as one
performed in Japan, and one-sixth as much a s cne performed in
Guam.
Cubi Point Naval Air Station is situated a c r oss the Bay
from the Subic complex . The air station consists of a 9,000
foot runway and ramp space for 200 aircraft, as well a s a l l the
associated maintenance , industrial, and hotel support for
s everal major aviation squadrons. Capacity i s available for
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handl ing bot h the C-1 41 and C-S transport ~ j r crRft , plus P-3C
pa tro l squadrons used f or antisubmarine and s ur ve Ll.Lance patr ols
in the Hes t enl Pacific and South China Sea. Cubi Point als o has
a 200 bed Naval ho spital. Both Cubi Point's and Subic Day's
facili U .es exlusive of the l and, are valued by the U.S. Navy a t
$1. 187 billion.
TIle San Biguel Naval Communications Station provides
communi cat i on relay needs for deployed ships and submarines. It
is very critical in the communications link wi t h fleet ba l l i s t i c
missile submarines deployed in t he area. Located about 4S
minutes from Subic Bay, the Communicati on St a t i on al so has
housing available for military families.
Clark Ai r Base includes over 63,000 acres within the areas
actually used by the U.S. and includes :
Clark Air Base Proper;
Wallace Air Station;
John Hay Air Station; and
Crow Valley Weapons Range.
The facilities include a ISO-foot by 10, SOO-foot r unva y , and
S90,000 square ya r ds of ramp space, which can acco mmoda te all
current USAF airlift ai rc r a f t . Included are all the support
facilities for the tactical un its permanently stationed at Clark
- hangers , machine shops, warehousing, personnel accommodati ons,
fuel f a r ms , and magazines. These include the USAF's 3rd
Tactical Fighter Wing, 374 Tactical Airlift Wing, and small
oper a t i ona l units. The base also has a 370 bed hospital whi ch
houses the USAF regional medical center , and is headquarters for
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the 13th Air Force. The bas e is also a major link in tl1e U. S.
military's global communication system.
Wallace Air Station is the ai r de fense coordination cen t er
for the area as well a s the location for a Voice of America
installation. The Crow Valley v,1eapons Range provides an
excellent location fo r live tactical training du e to the
e l a bor a t e instruments which let. pilots check their combat
skills. This allows deployed U.S. forces to maintain their
combat proficiency. The estimated total value of the military
f a c i l i t i es , exclusive of land value is $972 million. The base
population s for Subic and Clark ar.e noted in Table 1. The bases
employ over 43,000 Filipinos, representing the largest source of
employment in the country beyond the Philippine government
itself.
Strategic_.~~portance of the Bases
The facilities comprising the U.S. military bases in the
Philippines a r e certainly substantial and have been described by
the Pentagon as critical elements of U.S Pacific strategy. In
the 1960s and early 1970s, the Philippines were the principal
support area for Vietnam. Today, they have taken on a much
different role. The physical location and developed facilities
make it unreplaceable a s a base from which to protect both
American interests and deter Soviet influence and expansion
(which will be r eviewed in Chapter 3).
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TARLE 1
SUBIC BAY AND CLARK AIR BASE POPULATIONS
Clark
Subic
u.s.
military
9,260
5,016
u.s.
civilian
309
615
u.s.
dependents
12,220
6,883
* Foreign
civilians
2,454
9,581
Total
24,243
22,095
(* This does not include the tens of thousands of foreign
civilian employees who work on the bases as "Jnddrec t hires" for
contractor provided services.)
Source: U.S. Congress. Congressional Research Service.
Philippine Bases: U.S. Redeployment Options, by A.M.
Bower. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1986.
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The importance of the Sub:ic Bay/Clark c ompl exe s stems f rom
the advantageous co mbination of several f actors, the most
obvious of which 1s its geographic location. The Philippines
sit astride the sea lanes from Japan and South Korea to the
Indian Ocean - routes carrying the Persian Gulf oil on which
those two countries depend. Japan currently receives 60 percent
of its oil from the Persian Gulf via this route. The
traditional route was down the west side of the Philippines
throu~h the South China Sea 8Tound the southern tip of Southeast
Asia and then northwest through the Strai ts of Mallacca, between
Singapore and Sumatra.
Beginning in the mid-1960s, liquid bulk ships mushroomed in
slze , with many large tankers needing more than 50 feet of
water. Consequently, much of the shipping from t.he Indian Ocean
to Japan/South Korea now goe s to the east of the Philippines,
passing through the deeper Sundra Straits or Lombok Straits,
west and east of Java (see Figure 1). Hithout U.S. influence of
the Philippine bases in the South China Sea to keep the sea
lines open, the oil dependent economies of our Asian allies
would be at great risk.
U. S. strategy in East Asia has had a northern and southern
wing supported by U.S. bases in Japan and the Philippines. This
arrangement is reinforced by U.S. assets in South Korea backing
up Japan, and Guam supporting the Philippines. However, without
the Philippines, the whole equation is weakened due to t he
s upe r i or geographic location and facilities in the Philippines,
16
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The Sundra Straits (indicated by Route A) west of Java and
the Lomhok Straits (Route B) t o the east of Java, permit large
deep-draft tankers t.o transit from the Indian Ocean, east of the
strategic Philippine s an d deliver oil to Japan, South Korea , and
Tajwan.
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and the r ec ogn J t i on of the Korean and Japanese dependency on the
Southeast Asian sea lanes for their fuel supply.
The physical spacing of the Philippines between Hawai i and
Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean provide a natured way-ipoi.n t; f or
deployed U.S. Navy ships trans iting between the Indictll Ocean and
the West Coast of the U.S. The harbor facilities, r epair and
r efueling capabilities have long made Subic Bay a natural por t
to visit. The Philippine bases are ideally located for af.rl .Lf t
support to the Indian Ocean through Cl ark Air Base, which is the
major hub for airlift traffic into the Persian Gul f/Indian
Ocean.
Forward deployment of U.S. f ac i li t i e s has been a facet of
our maritime pelicy since World War II, and the Philippine bases
have be en an intrical part of this military strategy. Admiral
Long, farner Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet, stated in 1983:
The U. S. military facili ties in the PhHippines serve
important U.S. global and regional ob j ec t i ve s and
national security interests.
- First, they are an intregal part of a deterrent
system that signals to potential foes our resolve to
meet our commitments. They enahle us t o maintain the
readiness and capabilities needed to meet t hose
c ommi t men t s . They contribute to the confidence our
friends and allies have in U.S. will to fight.
- Second, they support U.S. capabilities in crisis and
c on t i ngenc i e s , not only throughout the Pacific Region
but also in the Indian Ocean , the Middle East, and up
the East Coast of Africa.
Third, they provide the capability to protect air and
sea lanes important to the U.S. and to our allies.
IS
- Fourth, they are a visible rn an f f e s t a t i on of U. S .
power in an area of obvious interest to the Sov ie t
Union. TIle se faciJ .ities provid e fo r capahilities
that impose certoin defense considerations on
potential adversaries. They a ls o provide us vri t.h
important cap ibilities in the event of worldwide
conflict.
- Fifth, they are a part of a worldwide defense s ystem
provld Irig unique communications f acilities of
importance to U.S strategic interest.
In addi t i on to providing the U.S. with major military
capabilities and serving important American regional
and global policy objectives and national s ecurity
interest, U.S. facilities in the Philippines
contribute directly to the defense treaties the
United States has in force with allies in the r egion.
U.S. military f aciJities and forces in the
Philippines, therefore, provide the practical means
by which the United States can meet these conmitments
(Ma y 1985).
The previous quote notes the strategic imp ortance of the bases
in the Philippine s to the United St a t e s and her allies.
Although Admiral Long made the above remarks in 1983, Admiral
Lyons, the current COID.ill8T1c1er in Chief Pacific Fleet, has shown a
similar regard for the strategic importance of ,t h e Philippine
bases. Additionally, Admiral Crow, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs, recently completed an assignment as Commander in Chief
Pacific Fleet, and has continued his strong concern for the
strategic importance of Southeast Asia in the policy making
envi r onmen t of Washington and the Pentagon.
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CHAPTER THREf.
SOUTHEA STERN AS IAN NATI ONS
Association of South eastern As i an Naticrns
Southeast Asia holds a vital interest to t he Free World due
to i ts strategic l ocation along the sea l an e s connecting the
Indian and pacific Oceans, and as a rapidly deve.l.opf.n g vo r Ld
trade center. This strategic importance i s evidenced by t he
passage of enough oil throueh the Mallacc a Strai ts to supply 75
pe rcen t of South Korean and Philippine oil needs aDd 00 percent
of Japan's. In addition, over 4,000 merchant ~hips pass through
the Straits pe r month (Armitage 1985).
Following the end of the Vietnam War in 1975 , the
Ass ociation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), consisting of
the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and
now Brunea, demonstrated a remarkable economic gr owt h and an
imp roved worldwide diplomatic s tatus. ASEAN is now the fifth
largest trading partner of the United States, with trade growth
f rom $2.8 billion in 1972 to $26.6 billion in 1984 (Armitage
1985).
ASEAN's improved international standing resulted in the
s election of Thailand to the United Nations' Security Council
and a greater voice in world a f f a i r s . This prestiee wa s used t o
generate a United Nati ons backed protest of the Vietnamese
20
invasion of Cambodia. As a group, the countries have been able
to resist any outside world power interference in the management
of their development and growth.
Instituted as an economic, Bocial, and cultural aJJiance
and not a military treaty organization, ASEAN is not capable of
providing mutual defense for members from outside intrusion.
The development of armed forces has strictly been for self-
protection against internal threats such as the New People's
Army (NPA) of the Philippines. Some expansion of an ASEAN
military role has been discussed, but the fragile, developing
economics of each country, which are extremely cash flow
dependent, would be hard pressed to sustain a nonprofit making
expenditure such as a military force. The countries realize that
Vietnam is so much more advanced militarily (the fifth largest
army in the world) and know they are incapable of financing a
military force able to resist a viable threat. Their decision
has been to not attempt a buildup.
The rapid growth of the region along with its acknowledged
lack of military strength has resulted in a dangerous
vulnerability. Fully aware of this situation, the ASEAN
countries are extremely sensitive to any signs that the United
States might be reducing its overseas commitments. The loss of
the Vietnam War, the removal of U.S. bases from Thailand, the
proposal during the Carter administration to remove U.S. troops
from South Korea have raised concerns of the ASEAN countries
regarding the U.S. commitment to the region. The Philippine
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bases are espec ially of c onc ern t o AS EAN since they are the
local symbol of U.S. presence in the a rea . The soviet ba cked
Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia has heightened this Hpprehensi on
with a resultant gr owi ng de pe ndenc y of Thailand on China for
a s sis t ance a ga i ns t the Vietnames e threat. Each country knows
that if the U.S. military power i s reduced they will be f or ced
to acc ept a growth in Soviet sponsored infl uenc e .
Southeast Asian Communi s t ThreClt
The Soviet threat in the Western Pacific Region has grown
significantl y over t he last 15 ye ars, in response to a perceived
weak mil:ltary and political status there. Although a Soviet
master Asian development plan do es not seem to exist , there a re
some definit e goals that must be examined and understood to
appreciate the actual Soviet threat. TItese goals are:
1) Relentless and continuous effort to alter the
military balance in the Pacific.
2) Continued efforts to weaken the present U.S. backed
Western Pacific Alliance systems of ASEAN and ANZUS.
3) Continued efforts to contain China's development
whLl.e attempting to improve relations without major
concessions.
4) Attempts to improve J apanese relations through a
series of economic concessIons while weakening
Japanese-United States relations and preventing
Japanese rearmament. The Soviets consistently
refuse t o concede on any J apanese related
territorial issues.
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5) Attempts to prevent any strategic ties between the
UnHed States and the ASEAN count r i e s , while
consolidating Soviet-Vietnamese relations.
6) Establish the Soviet Union in a position to playa
prominent role in the Asian security s yst em
CU.S. Congress 1984a).
The Sovie t military buildup in the Asian Region has been
mas s i ve in order to use the resulting influence toward the
establishment of a greater political and economic base. This
military expansion has included:
1) Establishment of a strategic command and control
center for their Far East theater of operations.
2) Modernization and enlargening of their Far East
ground forces. Over 500 thousand troops are
stationed along the Sino-Soviet border w"i th an
additional ten thousand troops based in the Sovie t
occupied Japanese Northern Territories.
3) The 29 divisions and 800 tactical aircraft in the
Southern Theater near the Persian Gulf have been
modernized.
4) A buildup of the Pacific Fleet to include two Ki ev
class carriers, 439 surface combatants, and 134
submarines. Major basing facilities have now been
established at Cam Rahn Bay and DaNang, Vietnam,
thus placing the Soviets 2,000 miles closer to the
critical sea lanes and out-flanking China (see
Figure 2).
5) Establishment of SS-20 missile sites east of the
Ural mountains with the capability of striking into
the Western Pacific (U.S. Congress 1984b).
The Soviets want to be considered an Asian power, but ha ve
e xper i enced difficulty developing their political influence in
the region with their only real success coming in Vietnam.
Partially to blame is the strong role of the United States in
the area, but more importantly has been ASEAN rejection of the
FIGjjRF 2
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Fi gur e 2 depicts the current situation where U.S. Forces
have the use of the Philippine bases while the Soviets are based
at Cam Ranh Bay and DaNang in Vietnam. The 600 n.m. radius
r epresents reasonable operating ranges for forces operating from
the respective bases. Within the area common to both, equally
capable forces could fight at comparable efficiency. Outside
the common area one side pays a significant time-distance
penalty.
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Sov iet backing of the Vietnamese i nva s i on of Cambodia. Vietnam
only ac ce pt ed Soviet elid after China sided vlith Thailand and
CambocUa against her. They were not anxious to have the hated
American domination replaced by a Soviet one. Flus, the
Vietnamese know that the Soviets would willingly sacrifice their
involvement i f necessary to improve their overall standing with
ASEAN.
In addition t o a Soviet backed threat, two other Communist
nations in the region must be c onsidered. North Korea has
e xpanded its military strength far beyond that needed for
strictly a defensive role. Their ~lell-exercised and modernized
army has grown less dependent on China and the Soviet Union and
has become more of an independent power. Kim I L-Sung, the North
Korean leader, has long advocated that he .,ould r eunite the two
Kor eas under one Communist rule.
China, although a formidabJe power, has not demonstrated a
desire to extend its control over the region. There have been
attempts at helping both Thailand and Cambodia against the
Vi etnamese, but generally without much success. The Vietnamese
army is simply too powerful to be controlled by the Chinese.
Realizing this, the Chinese leaders have elected to concentrate
more on the recovery of their failing economy than in regional
hegemony.
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CHAPTER FOUR
OPTIONS FOR RELOCATION
In view of the problems which are beseieing the new Aquino
government in the Philippines and the fact that the basing
agreement has evolved from one of complete U.S. dominance at no
cost, to one of increasing Philippine control and considerable
financial cost to the U.S., there is sincere concern on the part
of the U.S. military and the U.S. government as to whether the
U.S. will be able to retain its bases in the Philippines. lfuen
one considers the trerrds of reduced number of bases, the
dilution of U.S. control over the bases, the increasing cost of
the bases, as well as the instability of the Philippine
government, the future of our U.S. bases is indeed shakey.
A political climate definitely exists for the U.S. to
suffer a peace time loss of the bases in the Philippines. It is
therefore, of the utmost importance that the loss of the bases
be considered a possibility, and options considered for
relocation. The impacts of operating from other locations must
be considered as well as the political realities of trying to
relocate to alternative sites. Three relocation options are
reviewed. In developing these options and assessing alternative
sites, the physical facilities of Subic Bay Naval Station and
Clark Air Base must be kept in mind. The three options reviewed
are:
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Option 1: Use of existing and expanded U,S, Bases in
J ap an ( i ncl udi ng Ok Lnawa ) and Guam.
Option 2: Develop new U.S. base structures in
l-licronesia.
Option 3: Develop new bases al ong the Coast of the
South China Sea.
In reviewing these options, the key considerations should be
operational effectiveness, cost, and political feasibility. It
should be noted, however, that while military functions can be
accommodated at other locations, the favorable envi r onment and
inexpensive, a bundant work force of the Philippines cannot be
easily duplicated anYVlhere else. Because of the sheer size of
the f acilities at Subic and Clark, r elocation would have to
involve spreed ing the activities over s e ver al other bases as
oppos ed to ~oving everything to one new location.
Option 1
Use of Existing and Expanded U,S. Rases in Japan
( i ncl udi n g Okinawa) and Guam
Under this option, the one Navy ship homeported in Subic
Bay would be reassigned to Yokosuka, J apan where the remainder
of its battle group is based. The Ship Repair Facility could be
relocated to Yokosuka or Guam, requiring enlarging the
facilities presently there. The tactical fighter wing and
tactical airlift wings from Clark would require considerable
base expansion wherever relocated. The two best sites for
relocat ion would be either Okinawa or Guam, wi th Okinawa being
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the pref erabJe s i t e fo r t he figh te r wing as t hat would enable
the wi ng t o have SOffie access t o the are a of its present pr i mary
mission; i . e ., support for Sou theast Asia; and be ideaJ J.y
located f or i ts curren t sec ondary mission ; i.e., ~upport f or
Northeast Asia. The tactjcal airlift w:lng could be relocat ed to
Guam.
A. Operational Impact
The abi l i t y of the U.S. to provide operational s uppor t i n
the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf Region, Northea s t Asia, and
Southeast Asia would be severely hampered unde r th is option.
Figure 3 shows the operating zon es fo r land based a i r craf t under
this option. The U.S . ~ould be unable to ef f ect sea control
over the South China Sea from land.
Provision of ad equate support for operations i n Southeast
Asia would require an increase in U.S. forces. There are two
reasonS for this requirement. The increased s t eami ng time
(1,500 nautical miles - 3 days transit time) or fli ght time t o
the operating area would require adding additional forces to
maintaj n the same number of units on station; and extra forc es
would be required . to defend against Soviet forces who would be
able t o opera t e more efficiently f rom their nearby base. A
worse case would result if the Soviets were to gain Subic and
Clark by way of a Communist overt.hrow of the Aquino government l
which would onl y increase our need f or sea control. Figure 4
indicates such a s cena r i o . Increased force requirements ranging
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FIGURE 3
OPERATING AREAS UNDER OPTION 1:
U.S. RELOCATION TO EXISTING BASES ON GUAM AND OKlNAHA
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Under Option 1, U.S. forces would have grea.t difficulty
contesting Soviet control of the Straits of Mallacca, and some
difficulty with the Indonesian Straits. A significant increase
in force structure would be required to counter Soviet control
in those areas, and ensure our ability to support operations in
Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean/Persian Gul f .
FIGURE 4
OPERATING AREAS UNDER OPTI ON 1:
EXISTING BASES ON GUM\ AN)) OKINAHA WITH
SOVIET OCCUPATION OF PHILIPPINE BASES
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this variation of Option 1, Soviet use of the
Bases would make our ~i8sion in the area even more
requiring even greater increases in the force
Without the increases, the U.S. could lose all
the Straits of Mallacca, and would see use of the
Straits strongly contested by the Soviets.
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from a minimum of two additional ca rr i er battle groups i n a
peace time best case scenario, to a maxjmum of six additiona l
carrier battle groups for a war time s cenario where the Soviets
also have control of the Philippine ba s e s have been confiTIled by
Congressional studies. The absence of such f orces would place
the security of the Southeast Asia sea routes in extreme
jeopardy.
Support for Northeast Asia operations would be affected
under this option a l s o , as it would appear logical that Guam
would be t asked with additional sea control support functions in
Southeast Asia well beyond those it nOH performs. Concurrently,
although any aircraft relocated to Okinawa would be signifi-
cantly closer to Northeast Asia, the increased need for them to
provide support to the south would tend t o cff s e t any potentia]
Eains in support for Northeast Asia operations.
Support for operations jn the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf
would be affected in two ways. First, the route to the Indian
Ocean via the Straits of Mallacca would be less secure -
especially if the Soviets gained access to the Philippine bases.
Secondly, the U.S. would be dependent on an ally or friendl y
country granting refueling privileges for U.S. aircraft bound
for the Persian Gulf because of the greater distance from Guam
to the Indian Ocean. Even in pe nce time this has proven to be a
problem, as happened in the airlifts to Israel during the past
Nideast Wars.
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B. Cost Considerations
Hilitary construction and ot her moving costs would be the
least under this option although estimates r un as high as a
billion dollars. Expanding existing facilities usually costs
less than building from nothing, although addi t I ona L land
requirements could prove expensive.
The cost of new forcen is the highest under this option
with the four to six additional battle groups cos t Lng upwards of
$60 billion. Additional land based forces for Guam would add to
this cost.
Operations and maintenance costs would increase
significantly as a result of the increased force levels and the
less efficient basing arrangements. Higher funding requi.rements
would also result from the much higher wages paid in Japan,
Okinawa, and Guam as compared to the Philippines. In 1982, a 12
hour shift in Subic Bay cost $29 per shift laborer, whereas
Yokosuka costs were as high as $179 for the same shift. Labor
shortages on Guam might even necessitate importing of labor to
meet the increased maintenance demand. Additionally, Guam's
Apra harbor has a dry dock big enough to hold a carrier, but the
inner harbor, where all the Navy's facilities 2re located, is
too shallow for a carrier. The outer harbor could be developed,
but it would be more exposed to the severe storms that
occassionally batter the island.
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in the Pacific , if the Navy 'were to maLn t a i n ~ t s t empo of
operati ons in the South China Sea from the Marianas ( see Figures
5 and 6).
Support for operations in Northeast Asia vrouLd improve
slightly over Option 1. The expa nded bases in Gua m and the
Marianas should be better able to provide support, a l t hough an
increase in tactical air forces at Okinawa would again be
necessary to counter the Soviet land based forces to the south.
Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean operations would have
improved support as compared to Option 1 since the base at Palau
would improve the security of the sea routes through the
Indonesian St ra i t s . Airlift ope r a t i ons would still be strained
due to distances and woul d require a refueling point.
B. Cost Considerations
Military construction and moving costs would increase
noticeably due to the need for new base construction. Current
estimates indicate a requirement for up to $8 billion. Force
procurement costs would be slightly less, but still upwards from
$45 billion. Operation an d maintenance costs would be the same
a s Option 1 or higher, due t o the increase in new bases spread
over a wider area , and the increased need f or labor to support
them. These costs would essentially offset savings resulting
from the shorter steaming distances prov:f.ded by the bases at
Palau.
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FIGURE 5
OPERATI NG AREAS UNDER OPTlON 2:
U. S. REJJOCATlON TO OKINAWA AND NEH BASES IN THE
t-lARIANAS AND PALAU
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Under Option 2, the U.S. would continue to have great
difficulty contesting Soviet control of the Straits of Mallacca,
although the new base at Palau would considerably improve our
situation in the Indonesian Straits by giving U.S. control over
them. Increase in force levels would still be required,
although not at the level required under Option 1. The Indian
Ocean/Persian Gulf would be less threatened, but Southeast Asia
would still be a difficult area to control.
FIGURE 6
OPERATING AREAS UN DER OPTI ON 2:
U. S. RELOCATION TO OKINAWA AND NEVl BAS ES
IN THE MARIANAS AND PALAU,
'VJI TH SOV IET OCCUPATION OF THE PHILIPPI NE BASES
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Soviet Dcquisi tion of access to the Philippine bases would
enhance their control of the Straits of Mallacca and put some
pressure on U.S. use of the Indonesian Straits . Support for
operations in Southeast Asia would be more difficult, but
support of Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf operations would be about
the same.
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C. Political Fe~~~bility
Domcst:lc.<llly, the higher military construc.tion costs would
face cons Lde r ab.l.e opposition, as woul.d the funding for the
increased force levels. Again, a delay in funding would
severely jeopardize the U.S. ability to maintain sea control ,
and could result in the loss of the sea routes i f a crisis arose
early.
A more important problem could arise with the base in
Palau, as the Palau constitution outlaws nuclear weapons on its
territory. Efforts to amend this constitution have thus far
been unsuccessful .
Summary
This option would correct some of the problems with the
first option by reducing overcrowding at existing bases. The
bases at Palau would improve our ability to contest the sea and
air routes through the Indonesian Straits and east of the
Philippines, although the South China Sea wou.l.d remain an area
where U.S. forces would operate under a handicap in time of war.
Option 3
Development of New Bases Along the Coast of the South China Sea
Under this option, new basing agreements would be sought
with countries along the mainland. Two possible prospects would
be Singapore and Taiwan. Singapore was once the site of a major
3fl
British preeenc e and may have land and other asset s avai l ab le
for nego t f.o t i on . There is a strong industrial bz s e whi.ch could
develop to provide the maintenance support pl·esently en j oyed in
the Philippines. 'I'aLvran has space problems, but land might be
made ava i l a bl e and its modern work force and industri al bas e
could certainly meet U.S. needs. Other possibilities exist in
Thailand, Malaysia, or Indonesia.
A. Operationa~ Impact
As can be seen in Figures 7 and 8, support for operations in
Southeast Asia would be greatly enhanced over the other two
options. With bases in Singapore and Taiwan, land based
airpower could effectively counter the entire Soviet presence.
As a shore based facility, however, Singapore could face attack
from the north and is therefore much less secure than t he
Philippine assets. To ensure lines of communication with a base
in Singapore, it would be advisable to provide a base at Palau.
Operational support for Northeast Asia would be enhanced by
facilities at Taiwan. The base in Singapore would lessen the
need for bases at Taiwan and particularly Okinawa to project
strength southward.
Support of operations in the Persian Gulf would be enhanced
by the ability to provide a much greater security for the sea
and air routes to the Indian Ocean. In addition, securing of
the refueling stop at Singapore would enable the U.S. to
maintain its present airlift capabilities.
':: 0
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FIGURE 7
OPERATING AREAS U~'DER OPTr m: 3:
U.S. RELOCATION TO NEH BASES I N TAIWAN, SI NGAPORE, AND PALAU
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Unde r Option 3, U.S. would be able to effectively counter
the Soviet presence in Vietnam . some force level increases
would be required because forces would be dispersed to three
widely separated areas with reduced capability to reinforce one
another. U.S. ability to support operations in Southeast Asia
would be much improved as would its ability to support the
Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf operations.
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FIGURE £3
OPERATING AREAS UNDER OPTI ON 3:
U. S . REI,OCATI ON TO BASES IN TAH1AN, SINGAPORE, AND PALAU
WITh SOVIET OCCUPATION OF PHILIPPINE BASES
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Although Soviet occupation of the Philippine bases would
strengthen their presence, the U.S. would still be able to
effectively counter under this option. As before however, the
widely spread U.S. bases would require greater force levels, and
the increased Soviet presence would require those force levels
to be increased even more.
11
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B. Cost Considerntione
Base relocation costs under this option vT(luld be higher than
under either of the other two options hecaus e rental costs would
be added to the military construction and moving costs. New
force acquisition costs would be considerably less and would not
require a new battle group unless the Philippine bases were
occupied by the Soviets and significant new numbers of ships
assigned there. The likely availability of cheap labor should
result in lower maintenance costs, and the significant reduction
in new force assetR would result in much less erowth in
operational costs.
C. Political Feasibility
Political obstacles to this option may be unsurmountable.
Domestically, the proposal to lease military bases in new host
countries would have to run the spectrum of the entire U.S.
foreign policy making process in the Executive Branch and
Congress, facing opposition on policy as well as fiscal grounds.
Although the direct costs may be less than the other options, if
extensive foreign aid were tied to the proposal, Congressional
opposition would be high.
Additional opposition from the Navy would probably meet
with intentions to establish facilities in Singapore. Despite
the excellent industrial facilities which would carry out ship
repairs, the Soviets have routinely used Singapore repair
facilities. In view of the recent series of security
compromises ill the U.S . Navy, fac i l i t ie s in Singapore under the
watch ful eye of Sovi et s would not be welcomed.
On t he forei gn scene, a new base in 'I'ai.wan woul.d present A.
major confrontation Fith the People's Republic of China.
Tr emendous progress hs been made in the past fifteen yea r s in
r ega r ds to U.S. -China r elations, and any basing agreement with
Tai wan would have t o be handled very carefully t o avoid a major
rift in our r eLat Lons ; possibly presenting an impossible
si.tuation. In view of r ecent trends towards increased
independence in the ASEN~ countries, it may well prove
impossible t o gain agreement with Singapore or any other country
for a new U.S. base ag r eemen t on their territory.
Summary
This option wocld do the most to counter Soviet presence in
the South China Sea end has the least direct costs. At the same
Ume, it is the most difficult politically. These political
obstacles make the option extremely doubtful of execution.
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CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
There are two major purposes in writing this paper. The
first is to make the reader aware of the tremendous facilities
and importance of the U.S. military bases in the Philippines.
As a career naval officer who has been limited to duty stations
along the east coast of the United States, but whose ne xt
assignment will be in the Subic Bay, the education process
involved with this paper has been invaluable. The second
purpose has been to evaluate alternatives for relocating the
Philippine bases in view of the base agreement expiring in 1991.
Chapter One reviews some of the pivotal circumstances which
led to the fall of President Marcos and the establishment of
Corazon Aquino as the leader of the Philippine government. The
political pressure which the U.S. Congress brought on Marcos
cannot be overlooked regarding the collapse of his
administration. However, it is questionable as to whether
Congress or President Reagan will have similar influence over
President Aquino. The new Philippine government faces a severe
challenge in solving its economic problems and confronting
poltical insurgency within the country.
The fact that President Aquino has made no guarantees
concerning the future of the bases has led to concern in the
U.S. Defense Department. Additionally, Congress has hesltated
to allocate needed funds to the Philippine buses. The House
Armed Services Committee denied authorization for all Philippine
base facilities improvements in June 1986 on the grounds that
future access to Clark and the Subic Bay Naval Base was uncer-
tain (Roberts, 1986). However, the Appropriations Panel argued
that the bases "ere necessary and that denial of the new proj-
ects would "send a wrong signal" to the new Aquino government.
Chapter Two describes the physical facilities at Subic and
Clark and their capabilities to handle ships and aircraft
supporting the Seventh Fleet. The tremendous r epai r facilities,
fuel and ammunition storage, along vri t h the strategic location
of the Philippines make these bases an invaluable asset. In
February of 1986, President Reagan said foreign bases are vital
to keeping open the "sixteen choke points in the world, and I
don't know of any that's more important than the bases on the
Philippines" (Felton, 1986).
For the productive economies of U.S. allies in Asia, oil
which passes through the sea lanes in the Southeast Pacific is
critical. The U.S. presence in the Philippines guarantees that
the sea lanes will be open, but without the Philippine bases,
the United States would not be able to support and maintain its
level of operations in the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf.
Additionally, the Philippine bases are Vitally important to
carrying out the U.S. maritime strategy, whereby the presence or
proximity of U.S. assets are a deterrent to potential threats in
the region.
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Chapter Three addresses ASEAN's progress and development as
a world trading power. Hany world economists believe that the
greatest strides in world trade will come in the South Pacific
over the balance of this century. Despite the strength of their
trade, their security remains dependent on the U.S. presence in
the region. The sincerity of the United States' commitment to
this region has been questioned with the Vietnam War, removal of
bases from Thailand, and the proposal to withdraw U.S. troops
from South Korea. The withdrawal of the u.S. from the
Philippines could be detrimental to ASEAN and security in the
South Pacific.
The Soviets want to been seen as a power in Asia. This is
supported by the large naval buildup in Vietnam noted in Chapter
Three. The Soviet presence is menacing, especially considering
the importance of the South China Sea's sea lanes to the health
of the West's economy.
Chapter Four proposed three options for relocating the U.S.
assets currently in the Philippines. However, there is no
relocation option that provides an operational effectiveness
approaching that of the present basing arrangement. Of the
options considered, the first two put our ability to exercise
sea control in the South China Sea in jeopardy and carry with
them enormous costs for new operating forces. The third option,
while providing the best capability for sea control, is also the
most difficult to effect due to international and domestic
opposition, and will give the U.S. the least secure bases.
Options One and Two face strong political opposition a s
well, due to the costs involved. Consequently, construction of
new fac ilit i 8s would be funded (minimal costs) while the
operational forces (high costs) would suffer. The result be ing
that U.S. forces would not be able to operate effectively in the
South China Sea or Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf.
A basing structure involving some combination of Options
Two and Three would probably give an acceptable operational
arrangement, although the force level costs would still be
prohibitive. Even if funded, the arrangement would not be as
effective as our present base arrangement.
In retrospect, the answer to the hypotheses stated in the
introduction shouJd lead the reader to an easy conclusion; i.e.,
yes. The U.S. military bases in the Philippines are critical to
the promotion of regional stability, and the ability of the U.S.
Navy to carry out its maritime strategy of forward deployment as
deterrence. TIle options for alternative basing arrangements ar e
unacceptable and inadequate if the U.S. is to maintain its
current capabiljties in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean.
Should U.S. forces withdraw from the Philippines due to
lapse of the b~se agreements or fall of the Aquino government,
the probable outcome would be an initial relocation to existing
bases in the Western pacific. Over time, the additional basing
of Option 2 would be effected, but the additional f or ces
required will be only partially realized, with the result being
the forced acceptance of increased risk to the military. In
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wartime there is a strong liklihood tL0t we would l ose control
of the a r ea at least temporarily with a lengthening of the
~risis and more costJy battles resulting.
APPENDIX I
PJ>DlTIONAL LAND ASSETS IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC
Northern Marianas
Under a provision of the Covenant to Es t abl i sh a
Commonwealth of the Nor t hern Mariana Islands in Pol i t i cal Union
to the United States of Ame r Lca , a lease was executed at a cost
of approximately $32 million, for a 50 year period, renewable
f or another 50 ye ars at no additional cost, to make certain
lands available for military use by the U.S. These lands
include:
1) 17, 799 acres .on Tinian
2) 177 acres at Tanapag Harbor on the island of Saipan
3) 206 ac res comprising the entire island of Farallon
de Medinila (for use as a live fire target range).
Palau
Under the terms of the Compact of Free Association ,.rith
Palau, land options for a lease period of 50 years have been
executed. The lands made available include:
1) 30,000 acres for non-exclusive use for training and
maneuvers on the island of Babelthuap
2) 2,000 acres for exclusive U.S. use on the island of
Babelthuap for support facilities and ammunition
storage
3) 40 acres for exclusive use in Malakal Harbor for
port facility development
4) Joint use of Airai airfield on Babelthuap Island
with 65 acres adjoining the airfield for exclusive
U.S. use.
5) J oi n t use of Anguar airfield on Anguar Island with
65 acres adjoining the airfield for exclusive U.S.
use.
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